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TOPICS FOR TODAY
Main idea: Try to assess the state of the regulatory reform debate.
Consider some of the origins of the ﬁnancial crisis.
Ask two questions of current ﬁnancial regulatory reform
proposals:
Could these proposals have prevented the current ﬁnancial crisis?
Would they prevent future crises?OVERVIEW ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE REFORM PROPOSALS CONCLUSIONS
PREVIEW OF MAIN CONCLUSIONS
Only a few of the current ﬁnancial regulatory reform proposals
are likely to help prevent future crises.
As the nation’s lender of last resort, the Fed will be at the center
of any future ﬁnancial crisis.
This argues for the Fed playing the lead role in the new
regulatory structure.
A Fed with appropriately broad regulatory authority provides the
nation with the best chance of avoiding a future crisis.OVERVIEW ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE REFORM PROPOSALS CONCLUSIONS
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ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS
Fundamentally, the crisis was caused by a failure of ﬁnancial
engineering.
First, a securitization boom.
Second, a housing boom followed by a dramatic decline in housing
prices.
Securitized products did not take the possibility of a decline in
housing prices into account appropriately.
Securitized paper was worth much less than most anticipated, and
it was held by ﬁnancial entities worldwide, who had to accept
large losses.
The crisis caused runs in the shadow banking sector ...
... institutions that did not take deposits and so were not thought to
be susceptible to a run ...
... and because of this were not regulated as tightly as banks.OVERVIEW ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE REFORM PROPOSALS CONCLUSIONS
FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSETS BOOMOVERVIEW ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE REFORM PROPOSALS CONCLUSIONS
HOUSING BOOM AND BUSTOVERVIEW ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE REFORM PROPOSALS CONCLUSIONS
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SUMMARY OF THE TABLE
As the crisis started, 20 ﬁrms accounted for about 80 percent of
ﬁnancial sector assets in the U.S.
About 1/3 of this total was in banks.
About 2/3 was non-bank ﬁnancials: Government sponsored
enterprises, investment banks, insurance companies, and thrifts.
A large fraction of ﬁnancial assets in the U.S. were not in the
bank regulatory system.
All of these ﬁrms faced severe stress during the crisis, regardless
of the type of ﬁrm or the nature of regulation.OVERVIEW ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE REFORM PROPOSALS CONCLUSIONS
THE FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE
The crisis encompassed a far larger segment than just
commercial banking.
Many non-bank ﬁnancial ﬁrms, outside the banking sector, were
at the heart of the crisis.
These ﬁrms were not regulated by the Fed or other banking
regulators.
The crisis showed that large ﬁnancial institutions worldwide
were “too big to fail.” (TBTF)
We can let large ﬁnancial ﬁrms fail suddenly, but then global
panic ensues.
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SMALLER BANKS ARE NOT THE PROBLEM
Regulation works well for the thousands of smaller banks in the
U.S.
The system features deposit insurance plus prudential
regulation.
The system allows failure, but prevents bank runs and the
associated panic.
Smaller banks did not cause the crisis and do not need to be
re-regulated.
Changing this part of the regulatory environment as we are
trying to cope with high stress makes no sense.OVERVIEW ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE REFORM PROPOSALS CONCLUSIONS
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THE FED AND BANKING SUPERVISION
The U.S. has a primary regulator system for the nation’s 8,000+
commercial banks and thrifts.
The primary regulator has the key authority for the regulation of
the bank.
As of January 2007:
The Fed had primary regulatory responsibility for about 12 percent
of the banks.
About 14 percent by assets.
More than 85 percent of banks and assets had non-Fed primary
regulators.OVERVIEW ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE REFORM PROPOSALS CONCLUSIONS
THE FED AND THE FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE
Banks are only one part of the ﬁnancial landscape.
Non-bank ﬁnancial ﬁrms turned out to be the most troublesome
entities in this crisis.
The Fed had no supervisory authority over these entities:
Investment banks like Goldman Sachs and Bear Stearns.
Insurance companies like Prudential and AIG.
Financial hybrids like GE Capital and GMAC.
Bottom line: The Fed had access to a limited view of the ﬁnancial
landscape as the crisis began.OVERVIEW ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE REFORM PROPOSALS CONCLUSIONS
THE CRISIS UNFOLDS
As the crisis began, all eyes turned to the Fed as the lender of last
resort.
This always happens in a crisis—only the central bank can play
the lender-of-last-resort role.
But the Fed had detailed knowledge only of part of the ﬁnancial
landscape: that for which it had supervisory authority.
The Fed had limited access to information on institutions outside
its supervisory authority, especially non-bank ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
Many of the critical lending decisions involved the controversial
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THE REFORM RESPONSE
The clear lesson is that the Fed had insufﬁcient access to
information about the ﬁnancial landscape going into the crisis.
The Fed did not fully understand the potential for feedback
between the ﬁnancial sector and the rest of the economy.
Yet, the Fed will also be at the center of all future crises because
of its lender of last resort role.
The reform response should be to provide the Fed direct access
to detailed information across the entire ﬁnancial landscape, not
less as is the focus of current policy discussions.
A Fed with appropriately broad regulatory authority provides the nation
with the best chance of avoiding a future crisis.OVERVIEW ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE REFORM PROPOSALS CONCLUSIONS
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REGULATORY REFORM PROPOSALS
The House Bill (H.R. 4173; passed December 11, 2009).
The Senate Banking Committee draft legislation.
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SYSTEMIC RISK
The House bill creates an interagency Financial Services
Oversight Council (FSOC) to monitor systemic risks posed to the
ﬁnancial system.
In the House bill, the Federal Reserve would serve as the “agent”
to the Council and not as the systemic risk regulator.
Other debate has suggested investing the Council with more direct
authority.
Would this prevent a future crisis? I think the evidence is far
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MORE ON SYSTEMIC RISK
It seems like it would be difﬁcult for an interagency Council to
come to agreement on a speciﬁc risk and an associated action
when times are good.
In crises, decisions need to be made quickly, not subjected to
long committee debates.
It is also possible to overreact, shutting down a particular
practice which in reality does not pose a systemic risk.
The Fed would be better at navigating this type of
decision-making, which occurs commonly in monetary policy.
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A RESOLUTION REGIME
In the House bill, the FDIC is granted expanded authority to put
systemically important ﬁrms into receivership.
Other debate has suggested a special bankruptcy court for large
ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
Would this prevent a future crisis? It might.
This reform goes in the direction of strengthening market
incentives.
A resolution regime is a way of putting market discipline on
very large ﬁnancial ﬁrms—we really could allow failure without
creating panic.
The fear of failure would then prevent ﬁrms from taking
excessive risks and from being able to borrow at low rates.OVERVIEW ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE REFORM PROPOSALS CONCLUSIONS
A RESOLUTION REGIME: KEY CONCERNS
Key concern: How credible will the regime be? If it is not
credible and the government is going to come in after all, then it
is useless.
“Funeral plans” for the ﬁrm in the event of failure do not strike me
as credible.
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RESTRICTIONS ON 13(3) LENDING
In the House bill, signiﬁcant restrictions are placed on Fed
lending to non-banks under the “unusual and exigent
circumstances” clause.
Would this prevent a future crisis? No.
This will probably exacerbate a future crisis.
A future Fed facing a crisis will be more likely to say that it does
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CONSUMER PROTECTION
The House bill creates a separate Consumer Financial Protection
Agency (CFPA) with rule-writing authority for all banks and
non-banks that extend consumer credit.
This has been very controversial in the Congress.
Other debate has suggested putting this in other agencies or not
including it in the bill.
Would this prevent a future crisis? I don’t think so.
A fair playing ﬁeld is certainly desirable in all consumer
products.
But the housing boom was a classic gold rush: most people
bought the houses because they thought the prices would keep
rising.
A CFPA would not have changed the gold rush dynamic.OVERVIEW ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE REFORM PROPOSALS CONCLUSIONS
SECURED CREDITORS
In the House bill, secured creditors may be required to take a
10% haircut if the government has to step in and take over a
failing ﬁrm.
Would this prevent a future crisis? Probably not.
But, this provision does go in the direction of enhancing market
discipline.
Creditors would have greater incentives to understand and
analyze risk at large ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
Why limit creditor exposure to 10%?
Lots of evidence that money-at-risk is available.
Problem is "moral hazard" created by implicit or explicit
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SINS OF OMISSION
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CONCLUSIONS
Only a few of the current ﬁnancial regulatory reform proposals
are likely to help prevent future crises.
As the nation’s lender of last resort, the Fed will be at the center
of any future ﬁnancial crisis.
This argues for the Fed playing the lead role in the new
regulatory structure.
A Fed with appropriately broad regulatory authority provides the
nation with the best chance of avoiding a future crisis.Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
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